FBI – The Seventh Floor

The National Implications of Project 2025

Project 2025 and Its Risks to U.S. Intelligence, National Security, and Foreign Relations

As the United States approaches the 2024 presidential election, the future of its governmental structure and key institutions is under intense scrutiny. Project 2025, a comprehensive blueprint for reshaping the executive branch, has garnered both widespread interest and growing concerns across the political spectrum. Spearheaded by a coalition of conservative think tanks, Project 2025 seeks to overhaul numerous aspects of the U.S. government, streamline operations, and restore what its proponents see as a balance of power within the federal system. While its supporters argue that the project represents a necessary recalibration of government overreach, many experts in national security, intelligence, and foreign policy are sounding alarms about the potential unintended consequences of such a dramatic reorganization.

This article does not aim to pass judgment on the political merits of Project 2025 or to advance any partisan agenda. Rather, it seeks to examine the very real national security risks that could arise from its implementation, irrespective of one’s political affiliations. The safeguarding of U.S. intelligence and national defense should be a priority for all Americans, whether conservative, liberal, or otherwise. As one scholar recently noted, “the strength of the United States lies not in its ideological uniformity, but in its ability to protect the nation while accommodating diverse political viewpoints.”

To fully understand the risks associated with Project 2025, it is important to engage with the document itself and analyze how its proposed reforms could impact U.S. security infrastructure. These concerns are not hypothetical or alarmist; they arise directly from the scope and depth of the changes outlined in the plan. “We aim to dismantle the ‘deep state’ structures that have embedded themselves in Washington bureaucracy,” the document declares in its opening statement, referring to a network of career officials and institutional practices that some perceive as resistant to democratic oversight. However, in the pursuit of rooting out inefficiencies, there is a significant risk of undermining the very systems that keep the country secure.

At its core, Project 2025 proposes a sweeping reduction in the size and influence of federal agencies, including those with direct responsibility for national security, intelligence gathering, and foreign relations. For example, the document highlights the need to reform or even eliminate several key intelligence agencies that have “grown unaccountable and bloated over the decades.” Such rhetoric raises concerns among former and current officials in the intelligence community who argue that abrupt changes to these institutions could lead to gaps in intelligence gathering and analysis.

In fact, the project calls for restructuring the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and reviewing the role of the CIA, potentially merging or downsizing certain functions. According to Project 2025, this is necessary because “current intelligence agencies often operate with limited accountability and transparency.” However, critics argue that intelligence oversight already exists through congressional committees, and further restrictions or politicization of these agencies could impair their ability to provide unbiased intelligence, potentially leading to misjudgments about threats. The risk is that in seeking to make these agencies more accountable, the reforms might instead compromise the agility and independence that are crucial to effective intelligence operations.

A key area of concern relates to the project’s stance on international relations. “America must return to a policy of strength, clarity, and resolve,” the document states, advocating for a more assertive foreign policy. Yet this push for unilateralism could alienate long-standing allies and undermine U.S. standing on the global stage. The reshaping of the State Department, in particular, could strain diplomatic relations if career diplomats are replaced with political appointees, a point emphasized in the plan’s call to “drain the swamp”. While intended to streamline decision-making, this shift could erode decades of institutional knowledge and expertise that are essential in navigating complex global dynamics.

Another significant aspect of the proposal involves cybersecurity and the technological backbone of national defense. The plan explicitly calls for a reexamination of “cybersecurity priorities that do not align with our vision for a limited and efficient government.” This suggestion raises serious concerns about the potential weakening of the nation’s cyber defenses at a time when digital threats are escalating. Recent history has shown how cyberattacks from state actors like Russia and China can target critical infrastructure, from energy grids to electoral systems. A reduction in cybersecurity investment or personnel in favor of cost-cutting measures could open the door to catastrophic breaches.

The potential impact on U.S. foreign relations extends beyond intelligence and diplomacy to multilateral institutions. Project 2025 advocates for a reevaluation of America’s role in organizations such as NATO, the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization. “America should not be held hostage to globalist institutions that do not prioritize our national interest,” the document declares. While there is merit to reassessing these relationships, a sudden withdrawal from multilateral agreements or reduction in support for global governance frameworks could isolate the U.S. and empower adversarial states that are eager to fill the leadership void left behind. This could erode collective security efforts and make it more difficult to address transnational threats, such as terrorism, climate change, and nuclear proliferation.

There are also domestic security implications tied to Project 2025. The plan suggests overhauling the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), asserting that its functions have become redundant or overly politicized. While the need for greater efficiency in homeland security is a legitimate concern, scaling back DHS operations without carefully considering the consequences could weaken protections against both foreign and domestic threats. In particular, the document’s lack of focus on addressing domestic extremism has raised red flags. Given the recent rise in politically motivated violence, experts argue that any reduction in federal law enforcement capabilities targeting domestic terrorism could embolden extremist groups and create more vulnerabilities within U.S. borders.

Finally, Project 2025 envisions a significant shift in military and defense strategy, including a reassessment of military intelligence and counterintelligence functions. As the document puts it, “our military must focus on fighting wars and defending American interests, not on social engineering or bureaucratic expansion.” While this sentiment resonates with those frustrated by perceived inefficiencies in defense spending, it risks oversimplifying the complexities of modern military operations. For example, military intelligence plays a crucial role in preempting threats before they escalate into full-scale conflicts, and any reduction in its capabilities could hamper the U.S.’s ability to anticipate and respond to emerging global threats.

In conclusion, while Project 2025 presents a bold vision for a more streamlined and accountable federal government, it also raises serious questions about the potential impact on U.S. intelligence, national security, and foreign relations. The proposed changes may be driven by a desire to rein in perceived overreach, but they carry significant risks that could compromise the very foundations of America’s security infrastructure. The following article will explore these risks in greater detail, drawing on expert analysis and case studies to illustrate why all Americans—regardless of political affiliation—should be concerned about the national security implications of Project 2025. As the world grows more interconnected and the threats more complex, the protection of U.S. interests abroad and at home must

The Potential Risks to U.S. Intelligence Operations Under Project 2025

Project 2025, a sweeping initiative designed to reshape the federal government, has sparked widespread debate. While its advocates argue for streamlined governance and reduced bureaucracy, critics in the national security and intelligence communities are raising red flags about the potential risks posed to U.S. intelligence operations. Project 2025 aims to overhaul intelligence agencies and reform the national security apparatus, but in doing so, it may unintentionally jeopardize the integrity, independence, and effectiveness of U.S. intelligence efforts. This section explores how some of the key components of Project 2025 could undermine U.S. intelligence operations and weaken national security, using quotes from the document to illustrate these concerns.

Politicization of Intelligence

One of the most pressing concerns is the potential politicization of intelligence. Project 2025 advocates for placing political appointees in key leadership roles across federal agencies, including those responsible for intelligence gathering and analysis. The document argues that “the entrenched deep state has used its unchecked power to subvert the will of the people and undermine the democratic process.” To counter this, the project calls for widespread leadership changes.

While the intent is to bring greater accountability to intelligence agencies, placing individuals with little or no experience in intelligence operations at the helm could seriously compromise the objectivity and effectiveness of intelligence assessments. Intelligence is inherently apolitical, requiring expertise and independence to provide unbiased analysis on threats to national security. A politically motivated intelligence apparatus risks producing assessments shaped by ideology rather than fact, which could distort decision-making at the highest levels of government.

By introducing leaders without relevant experience, Project 2025 risks undermining the careful balance between intelligence and politics. Decisions based on skewed intelligence could lead to catastrophic outcomes, as the importance of impartiality is critical to correctly assessing threats from adversaries like Russia, China, and terrorist organizations.

Undermining Analytical Integrity

The danger of politicization extends beyond leadership appointments to the actual process of intelligence analysis. Project 2025 emphasizes the need to align intelligence operations more closely with political objectives. As the document states, “intelligence agencies must be reined in to prevent overreach and manipulation by bureaucratic elites with their own agendas.” While oversight of intelligence agencies is essential, there is a risk that this approach could lead to the suppression or manipulation of intelligence assessments.

If intelligence agencies are pushed to prioritize political narratives over factual reporting, the integrity of intelligence products may be compromised. For example, intelligence on emerging threats could be downplayed or ignored if it contradicts the administration’s policy objectives. This could leave the U.S. vulnerable to unanticipated threats or cause decision-makers to misjudge the severity of international crises. The prioritization of ideology over data risks creating an intelligence environment where analysts feel pressure to conform to political expectations, undermining the objective analysis that is crucial for national security.

Weakening Oversight Bodies

Independent oversight is a cornerstone of maintaining accountability within intelligence agencies. However, Project 2025 proposes a reassessment of existing oversight mechanisms, which could result in a weakening of the independent bodies that currently monitor intelligence operations. The document calls for “a restructuring of intelligence oversight to ensure transparency and accountability,” but critics warn that this could be code for reducing the power of congressional oversight committees.

If the oversight capabilities of bodies like the House Intelligence Committee are diminished, it could create an environment where intelligence activities operate without proper scrutiny. This increases the risk of abuse or the failure to recognize and address critical security threats. Robust oversight ensures that intelligence agencies are held accountable, operate within legal boundaries, and provide accurate assessments to policymakers. Any weakening of these checks and balances could lead to significant intelligence failures or abuses of power that go unchecked.

Decreased Cooperation with Intelligence Allies

Another potential consequence of Project 2025’s proposed reforms is the erosion of international intelligence cooperation. The U.S. intelligence community relies heavily on collaboration with foreign partners to gather information on global threats. Project 2025’s focus on “America first” strategies and a reevaluation of international alliances could cause key intelligence-sharing partners to hesitate or even reduce cooperation.

Allies may become more reluctant to share sensitive intelligence if they perceive that U.S. intelligence agencies are becoming overly politicized or if protocols for sharing information change in ways that make collaboration more difficult. For example, the Five Eyes intelligence alliance (comprising the U.S., UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) relies on mutual trust and a commitment to non-partisan intelligence sharing. Any signs that U.S. intelligence is becoming politicized could lead these countries to hold back critical information, weakening collective security efforts against global threats like terrorism and cyberattacks.

Reduction in Intelligence Capabilities

The structural reforms proposed by Project 2025 could also lead to a significant reduction in intelligence capabilities. The document calls for a “streamlining of intelligence functions and a review of the efficacy of current programs,” which could lead to budget cuts, personnel reductions, or the consolidation of intelligence agencies. While the goal of eliminating inefficiency is understandable, cutting resources in key areas could have serious consequences for intelligence gathering and analysis.

Programs that focus on counterterrorism, cyber defense, and counterintelligence could face reduced funding or staff, making it harder for the U.S. to detect and respond to threats. The reduction in intelligence capabilities would likely lead to intelligence gaps, where critical information on foreign adversaries or potential attacks goes unnoticed. This could also weaken the U.S.’s ability to respond swiftly to emerging crises, from terrorist plots to cyberattacks.

Diminished Cybersecurity Defenses

A particularly vulnerable area under Project 2025 is cybersecurity. The document highlights the need to “reassess cybersecurity priorities to ensure alignment with our broader vision of limited and efficient government.” While efficiency is important, reducing the workforce or budget allocated to cyber defense could create significant vulnerabilities, both within government systems and the private sector.

In today’s increasingly digital world, cyberattacks represent one of the most significant threats to national security. State-sponsored hackers from countries like China, Russia, and Iran routinely target critical infrastructure, including financial institutions, energy grids, and even election systems. If the U.S. reduces its investment in cybersecurity personnel, tools, and technology, it risks creating openings for adversaries to launch devastating cyberattacks with far-reaching consequences.

Outsourcing Sensitive Intelligence Functions

Finally, Project 2025 suggests increasing the use of private contractors to carry out intelligence functions, arguing that “outsourcing can enhance efficiency and reduce costs in areas traditionally dominated by bureaucratic institutions.” However, outsourcing sensitive intelligence operations to private companies carries significant risks. Contractors may not be subject to the same level of oversight as government employees, and the transfer of classified information to private entities increases the risk of security breaches.

The use of private contractors in intelligence has been a controversial issue in the past, most notably with the revelations surrounding contractors like Edward Snowden, who leaked classified information from the National Security Agency (NSA). The more that sensitive intelligence operations are outsourced, the greater the risk of future breaches that could compromise U.S. national security.

While Project 2025’s aim of creating a more streamlined and efficient government has its merits, the proposed reforms to the U.S. intelligence community could pose serious risks to national security. Politicization of intelligence, weakening of oversight bodies, reduced cooperation with allies, diminished intelligence capabilities, weakened cybersecurity defenses, and the outsourcing of sensitive functions all have the potential to undermine the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence operations. As the U.S. faces increasingly complex global threats, maintaining an independent, well-resourced, and robust intelligence apparatus is more important than ever. Any efforts to reform the intelligence community must be undertaken with caution, ensuring that national security remains the top priority.

Erosion of Military and National Defense Intelligence

One of the central tenets of Project 2025 is the dismantling of what it calls “entrenched deep state” structures within federal agencies, including military and national defense intelligence. The document argues that “bureaucratic elites have seized control of government institutions to serve their own ends, often to the detriment of national interests.” While this rhetoric resonates with those seeking government reform, the proposed changes could result in the defunding or dismantling of key military intelligence functions that are critical for national defense.

Military intelligence plays an indispensable role in monitoring adversarial activity, preempting threats, and guiding U.S. defense strategy. Project 2025’s call for cuts and restructuring could lead to reductions in personnel and resources, diminishing the effectiveness of these intelligence operations. Without robust military intelligence, the U.S. could face blind spots in understanding the strategies and capabilities of foreign powers, leaving the country vulnerable to surprise attacks or miscalculated military responses.

Foreign Espionage Exploits Gaps

One of the most serious risks associated with Project 2025’s proposed reforms is the potential for increased foreign espionage. The document advocates for weakening security protocols that it claims are part of the “bureaucratic bloat,” including counterintelligence measures that protect against espionage by foreign adversaries. This includes a reevaluation of security clearance procedures, with an emphasis on streamlining access to classified information. The document states, “The federal government’s over-reliance on security clearance protocols has slowed operations and created unnecessary roadblocks to efficiency.”

“The federal government’s over-reliance on security clearance protocols has slowed operations and created unnecessary roadblocks to efficiency.”

However, easing these protocols could open the door to espionage from countries like Russia, China, and Iran, which actively seek to exploit any gaps in U.S. intelligence defenses. By weakening counterintelligence efforts, Project 2025 could inadvertently make it easier for foreign spies to penetrate critical sectors of the U.S. government and military. The reduction of security clearance measures, in particular, may allow individuals with compromised loyalties to gain access to sensitive information, putting national security at risk.

De-prioritization of Emerging Threats

Project 2025’s emphasis on ideological battles, including the elimination of what it deems as overreach by federal agencies, could also lead to the de-prioritization of emerging global threats. The document suggests that national security efforts should be refocused to align more closely with the administration’s broader political objectives, declaring, “Government resources should not be wasted on globalist agendas but instead concentrated on securing America’s immediate interests.”

This shift in focus could cause the U.S. to overlook pressing and rapidly evolving security threats, such as cybersecurity risks, the weaponization of artificial intelligence, and the militarization of space. Emerging technologies are quickly transforming modern warfare, and the ability of the U.S. to stay ahead of these developments is critical to maintaining global security. If Project 2025 succeeds in diverting attention away from these issues, the country may find itself unprepared to confront new forms of warfare, giving adversarial nations a strategic advantage.

Weakened Nuclear Security

One of the more concerning potential outcomes of Project 2025’s proposals is the disruption of agencies responsible for managing the nation’s nuclear security. The Department of Energy (DOE), which plays a key role in overseeing the safety and security of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, is specifically mentioned in the document as an agency requiring “structural reform to prevent inefficiencies.” The project’s focus on reducing the size and scope of government agencies could lead to budget cuts or personnel reductions within the DOE’s nuclear security division.

Nuclear security is one of the most sensitive and critical components of national defense. Any disruption to the systems overseeing the management, maintenance, and protection of nuclear materials could expose vulnerabilities in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, potentially making it easier for adversaries to exploit these weaknesses. At a time when nuclear tensions are rising globally, particularly with countries like North Korea and Iran, weakening the nation’s nuclear security infrastructure could have devastating consequences.

Diplomatic Security Gaps

In addition to military and intelligence risks, Project 2025’s reforms could also jeopardize the safety of U.S. diplomats and missions abroad. The document advocates for a reduction in the scope of federal agencies involved in diplomatic security, stating that “the federal bureaucracy’s excess resources have been misallocated to international programs that do not prioritize American safety.” This focus on reducing overseas involvement may result in fewer resources dedicated to protecting U.S. embassies, consulates, and diplomatic personnel.

Diplomatic security is a crucial component of foreign relations, especially in volatile regions where U.S. interests are at risk. Project 2025’s reforms could leave U.S. missions more vulnerable to attacks from terrorist groups or state-sponsored actors. By reducing intelligence operations that monitor threats to diplomats, the U.S. may find itself blindsided by attacks, much like the 2012 Benghazi incident, which resulted in the deaths of four Americans, including the U.S. ambassador to Libya.

While Project 2025’s ambition to reform federal agencies and reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies may resonate with many Americans, its potential impact on national security infrastructure cannot be ignored. The erosion of military and defense intelligence, increased vulnerability to foreign espionage, the de-prioritization of emerging threats, weakened nuclear security, and the creation of diplomatic security gaps all present serious risks. As the U.S. faces increasingly complex global challenges, the integrity of its national security infrastructure must remain a top priority, and any reforms must be undertaken with caution to avoid unintended consequences.

Loss of Diplomatic Expertise

One of the most troubling aspects of Project 2025 is the potential loss of seasoned diplomatic expertise. The document calls for a reshuffling of leadership across federal agencies, stating that “a government run by unelected bureaucrats has undermined the will of the people for too long.” While this rhetoric resonates with those who seek reform, it could lead to the replacement of experienced diplomats with political appointees who lack the knowledge and expertise required for complex international negotiations.

Diplomacy is a delicate balancing act that requires years of experience and a deep understanding of global politics. Seasoned diplomats play a critical role in resolving conflicts, negotiating trade agreements, and maintaining alliances. If these professionals are replaced by individuals with little to no foreign policy experience, the U.S. risks losing its edge in global diplomacy. This could result in the erosion of U.S. influence at the negotiating table, making it harder to secure favorable outcomes in discussions with adversaries and allies alike.

Moreover, the replacement of experienced diplomats with politically aligned individuals could undermine the credibility of U.S. foreign policy. Negotiations on issues such as arms control, trade, and security require a level of expertise that cannot be easily replaced. By sidelining career diplomats, Project 2025 could weaken America’s ability to navigate the complexities of international relations, leaving the country vulnerable to diplomatic blunders and missed opportunities.

Strained Relations with Allies

Another major concern is the potential for strained relations with traditional allies. Project 2025 advocates for aggressive changes to U.S. policies, arguing that “America must stop bowing to globalist elites and prioritize its own interests.” While this rhetoric appeals to a segment of the population, it risks alienating key partners and undermining long-standing alliances such as NATO.

Alliances like NATO are built on mutual trust, shared values, and a commitment to upholding international norms. Aggressive shifts in U.S. policy, particularly if they disregard international agreements or challenge established norms, could strain relationships with key allies in Europe, Asia, and beyond. If the U.S. appears unwilling to cooperate on issues of global security, traditional allies may become more reluctant to collaborate on joint defense initiatives, intelligence sharing, or counterterrorism efforts.

For instance, if Project 2025’s reforms lead to reduced U.S. engagement with NATO or other international organizations, it could weaken collective security efforts and make it harder for the U.S. to coordinate responses to global threats. This could embolden adversarial powers like Russia, which has long sought to fracture NATO’s unity, and create opportunities for exploitation by adversaries.

Increased Global Instability

Project 2025’s vision of a more insular U.S. foreign policy could also contribute to increased global instability. The document calls for the U.S. to “focus on securing its own borders and interests, rather than policing the world.” While there is merit to reassessing the extent of U.S. military interventions abroad, stepping back from leadership on global security issues could create power vacuums in volatile regions such as the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific.

When the U.S. steps back from its role as a global leader, adversarial powers like China, Russia, and Iran are more likely to assert their influence, potentially destabilizing these regions. In the Indo-Pacific, for example, China’s aggressive expansion in the South China Sea could go unchecked without a strong U.S. presence, leading to increased tensions and the potential for conflict with neighboring countries. Similarly, in the Middle East, a reduction in U.S. engagement could embolden Iran to pursue more aggressive policies, further destabilizing an already volatile region.

Without the stabilizing influence of U.S. leadership, regions that are already fragile could become more susceptible to conflict, terrorism, and humanitarian crises. This could have ripple effects across the globe, threatening global security and undermining efforts to promote peace and stability.

Weakening of Multilateral Organizations

Another significant risk of Project 2025 is its potential to weaken multilateral organizations that play a critical role in maintaining global security. The document criticizes the U.S.’s involvement in international institutions, stating that “America must stop funding and propping up globalist organizations that do not serve its interests.” This approach could lead to a deliberate effort to undermine U.S. participation in or funding for organizations such as the United Nations, NATO, or the World Trade Organization (WTO).

These organizations are essential for promoting international cooperation, resolving conflicts, and addressing global challenges such as climate change, terrorism, and trade disputes. By reducing its involvement in these organizations, the U.S. risks weakening their effectiveness and leaving a leadership vacuum that could be filled by countries with competing interests. For example, China has increasingly sought to assert its influence within the United Nations and other international bodies, and a diminished U.S. presence could allow it to shape global norms and policies in ways that undermine American values and interests.

Loss of Moral Authority

Finally, Project 2025’s proposed changes to U.S. policies on human rights, democratic norms, and military interventions could erode the country’s moral authority on the global stage. The document argues that “America’s foreign policy should prioritize its own sovereignty over globalist agendas,” which could lead to a reduction in U.S. efforts to promote human rights, democracy, and international law.

The U.S. has long been a global leader in advocating for these values, and any retreat from this role could damage its credibility in international forums. Without a strong commitment to human rights and democratic norms, the U.S. may find it harder to lead on critical issues such as counterterrorism, arms control, or nuclear non-proliferation. This could weaken global efforts to address these challenges and reduce the U.S.’s ability to shape international policies that reflect its values.

While Project 2025’s goal of streamlining government and reducing bureaucratic influence may appeal to many, the potential damage to U.S. foreign relations and diplomacy cannot be overlooked. The loss of diplomatic expertise, strained relations with allies, increased global instability, the weakening of multilateral organizations, and the erosion of U.S. moral authority all present serious risks. As the U.S. navigates an increasingly complex global landscape, maintaining strong diplomatic capabilities and alliances is more important than ever to safeguard national and international security.

Undermining Federal Law Enforcement

One of the key concerns is Project 2025’s stance on federal law enforcement agencies like the FBI. The document states that “politicized bureaucracies have weaponized their authority against the American people,” advocating for leadership changes or even defunding efforts aimed at the FBI. However, the FBI plays a crucial role in counterterrorism and counterintelligence within the U.S. Weakening this agency could hinder its ability to track and thwart potential terrorist plots, both foreign and domestic.

The FBI’s work includes monitoring extremist groups and preventing acts of violence, such as domestic terrorism. Without proper funding and leadership, the agency may struggle to keep pace with these threats, putting American lives at risk. By undermining federal law enforcement’s capabilities, Project 2025 could inadvertently create a more dangerous internal security landscape.

Increased Domestic Terrorism Risks

Project 2025 also suggests a reordering of intelligence priorities that downplays domestic extremism. The document criticizes “federal overreach in targeting American citizens under the guise of national security,” which may result in a reluctance to address the growing threat of domestic terrorism. Extremist groups, particularly those aligned with white supremacist ideologies or anti-government movements, have become increasingly emboldened in recent years. A shift away from addressing these threats could allow these groups to operate more freely, increasing the risk of violence and attacks within U.S. borders.

By deprioritizing domestic extremism as a national security concern, Project 2025 risks creating an environment where extremist groups feel less restrained by law enforcement, emboldening them to take more aggressive actions.

Weakening Homeland Security

Another critical aspect of Project 2025 is its proposed restructuring of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The document argues that “DHS has become bloated and ineffective,” calling for a reduction in its role. However, DHS is responsible for safeguarding against terrorism, managing immigration, and responding to natural disasters. Weakening DHS would hinder the country’s ability to effectively respond to these challenges, leaving the U.S. more vulnerable to both man-made and natural crises.

Whether it’s defending against terror attacks or coordinating disaster relief, DHS plays an essential role in protecting the American public. By reducing its resources and scope, Project 2025 could undermine the nation’s ability to respond swiftly and effectively to security threats, putting lives and property at risk.

Conclusion: The Far-Reaching Risks of Project 2025

As the vision of Project 2025 unfolds, it becomes clear that the initiative, while rooted in the intention to overhaul what it perceives as bloated federal bureaucracy, poses a series of alarming risks to U.S. national security, intelligence, and diplomacy. Its sweeping proposals, framed as a means to reclaim government for the people, carry the potential for significant unintended consequences that could weaken the very institutions tasked with safeguarding America from both foreign and domestic threats. When viewed collectively, the dangers presented by these reforms create an undeniable risk of destabilizing the nation’s security infrastructure at a time of heightened global tension and internal division.

Undermining Intelligence and National Security

At the heart of Project 2025 is the idea of reforming and, in some cases, dismantling federal agencies critical to U.S. intelligence operations. The document’s call for replacing career intelligence professionals with political appointees threatens to politicize intelligence assessments and undermine the objectivity necessary for sound decision-making. As intelligence becomes driven by political agendas, there is a real risk that key threats could be overlooked, misinterpreted, or dismissed entirely.

The ripple effects extend to weakened oversight and reduced cooperation with international intelligence allies. Project 2025’s emphasis on prioritizing U.S. sovereignty over collaborative global efforts risks alienating critical intelligence partners. At a time when the U.S. faces complex, borderless threats—such as cyberattacks, terrorism, and foreign interference in domestic affairs—the erosion of these relationships could result in a dangerous blind spot, leaving the country vulnerable to attacks it might otherwise have thwarted with the help of its allies.

Moreover, the potential reduction in intelligence capabilities, whether through defunding or restructuring, threatens critical functions such as cyber defense, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism. At a time when adversaries like China and Russia are employing increasingly sophisticated methods to undermine U.S. interests, Project 2025’s proposed changes could leave the nation exposed to infiltration, espionage, and interference on an unprecedented scale.

The Diplomatic Fallout

On the international stage, the consequences of Project 2025’s approach to diplomacy are equally alarming. By proposing to replace seasoned diplomats with political appointees, the initiative threatens to erode the institutional knowledge and experience that are essential for managing complex international relations. Diplomatic expertise cannot be replaced overnight, and without it, the U.S. risks entering negotiations on critical issues such as arms control, trade agreements, and conflict resolution at a severe disadvantage.

Project 2025 also raises the specter of strained relations with traditional allies. Its aggressive stance on prioritizing U.S. interests, often at the expense of international norms, could weaken longstanding alliances, particularly with NATO and other multilateral organizations. These relationships are vital to global security, and any weakening of U.S. commitments could embolden adversarial powers like Russia, China, and Iran to exploit the resulting instability.

This potential retreat from global leadership is not only a strategic risk but also a moral one. The U.S. has long positioned itself as a defender of democratic values, human rights, and international law. Should Project 2025 lead to a de-prioritization of these commitments, the U.S. risks losing its moral authority on the world stage. Without the guiding influence of American leadership, global efforts to combat terrorism, prevent nuclear proliferation, and maintain peace in volatile regions could falter, creating a more chaotic and dangerous world.

The Domestic Security Dangers

The internal risks posed by Project 2025 are just as concerning. The potential undermining of federal law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI, could severely hamper the U.S.’s ability to counter domestic terrorism and conduct counterintelligence operations. In an era where domestic extremism is on the rise, the weakening of these agencies could allow extremist groups to operate with greater impunity, further endangering American lives.

Likewise, the restructuring or defunding of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would have profound consequences for U.S. domestic security. DHS plays a critical role in defending against terrorism, managing immigration, and responding to natural and man-made disasters. Weakening this agency would compromise the country’s ability to respond to these threats effectively, leaving the U.S. more vulnerable to both external attacks and internal crises.

A Call for Caution

While Project 2025 may appeal to those who seek smaller government and a reduction in what they perceive as entrenched bureaucracy, the potential costs of these reforms are too high to ignore. The initiative risks unraveling the very systems that have kept America safe and secure for decades, and the consequences of such a move would be felt far beyond U.S. borders.

The world is at a critical juncture, with the rise of authoritarianism, technological threats, and global instability making it more important than ever for the U.S. to remain a leader in intelligence, national security, and diplomacy. Project 2025, in its current form, threatens to dismantle the infrastructure that enables the U.S. to meet these challenges head-on.

If the goal is to create a more efficient and accountable government, then the reforms proposed by Project 2025 must be approached with caution. Any changes to the nation’s intelligence, security, and diplomatic frameworks should be made with an eye toward strengthening, rather than weakening, the systems that have long protected America. Only then can the U.S. continue to lead on the global stage and maintain the security of its citizens at home.

A Perfect Storm: Israeli Intelligence, Hamas, and Growing Tensions on American Soil

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The Intelligence Gaps That Led to the October 7 Attack and the Fallout Threatening U.S.-Israeli Relations

Israel’s intelligence services are renowned for their sophistication and their ability to anticipate and mitigate threats, both within and beyond the country’s borders. Institutions like the Mossad, Shin Bet, and military intelligence have long been regarded as some of the most advanced in the world, particularly when it comes to monitoring militant groups like Hamas. So when, on October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a surprise and highly coordinated attack on Israel, the scope of the intelligence failure was both shocking and humbling.

Hamas managed to carry out a devastating series of strikes on more than 20 Israeli towns and several military bases, leaving Israeli society reeling. The attacks raised immediate and uncomfortable questions: How did this happen? How did Hamas orchestrate such a large-scale, complex operation without Israeli intelligence services detecting it in time to act?

As the dust settled in the days following the attack, more details about the intelligence failures began to emerge. The New York Times reported on October 10, 2023, that Israeli intelligence had picked up signs of suspicious activity on Hamas networks in the lead-up to the assault. However, these signals were not fully understood or acted upon, much like the failure of the U.S. to connect the dots before the 9/11 attacks.

Javed Ali, a counterterrorism expert who spent years working within U.S. intelligence, likened the challenge to assembling a complex puzzle. “Intelligence analysis is like putting a thousand-piece jigsaw puzzle together from individual pieces of intelligence every day,” he explained. “You try to make judgments for policymakers to act on those insights.” In this case, the pieces didn’t fit together quickly enough to prevent the tragedy.

As reports came in, it became clear that Hamas had undertaken meticulous planning for the assault, going to extraordinary lengths to avoid detection. The plot may have been concealed within the typical noise of everyday militant activity or possibly even intentionally diverted to avoid arousing suspicion. Ali speculated that Iran might have played a supporting role in coordinating or backing Hamas’s efforts, though U.S. officials have not confirmed any direct Iranian involvement at this stage.

For Israel, a country that shares a border with Hamas-controlled Gaza, the failure to anticipate such an attack is particularly glaring. Many Israeli officials had assumed that Hamas, weakened by years of Israeli counterterrorism efforts, lacked the capability to mount a large-scale offensive. This underestimation of Hamas’s capabilities was a dangerous miscalculation.

How Israeli Intelligence Works—and Where it Stumbled

The broader context of Israel’s intelligence failure can be better understood by examining the structure of its intelligence community. Israel’s intelligence apparatus mirrors, in many respects, the system employed by the United States. Shin Bet handles domestic threats, much like the FBI, while Mossad oversees foreign intelligence operations, similar to the CIA. In addition, military intelligence takes the lead on threats to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), akin to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency.

Israeli intelligence agencies rely on a combination of traditional methods, including human intelligence (spies), signals intelligence (intercepting electronic communications), imagery intelligence (satellite surveillance), and open-source intelligence (publicly available data). In theory, these sources combine to form a comprehensive picture of potential threats. In practice, the October 7 attack revealed that these mechanisms, while sophisticated, are not foolproof.

A major weakness in Israel’s intelligence system is the lack of an overarching authority to coordinate efforts across agencies. Unlike the U.S., which established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) after the 9/11 Commission identified communication failures between intelligence bodies, Israel has no equivalent centralized office. In Israel, intelligence agencies operate in relative silos, with no single entity responsible for ensuring that information flows seamlessly between them.

Ali argues that this structural gap might have contributed to the intelligence breakdown leading up to the Hamas attacks. Without a central intelligence coordinator, it is possible that critical pieces of information from different agencies were never fully integrated or understood in a timely manner. Looking forward, he suggests that Israel might benefit from creating an office similar to the ODNI to avoid such lapses in the future.

The U.S.-Israel Intelligence Partnership and Gaps

The relationship between U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies is famously close. The two nations have a bilateral intelligence-sharing agreement that ensures critical information about potential threats is passed between them. This collaboration is separate from the larger international intelligence-sharing alliance known as the “Five Eyes,” which includes the U.S., the U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

Despite this close partnership, it appears that the U.S. may not have had significant intelligence on the Hamas plot, possibly due to shifting global priorities. In recent years, U.S. intelligence agencies have increasingly focused on Russia, China, and the war in Ukraine. This shift may have left blind spots in monitoring groups like Hamas, who, by all appearances, successfully took advantage of this opportunity to launch a major operation.

A Shifting Focus: The Rise of Pro-Palestinian Sentiment in the U.S.

In the wake of the October 7 attacks, another concerning development has captured the attention of Israeli officials: the growing pro-Palestinian sentiment within the United States, particularly on university campuses. In the days and weeks following the attacks, numerous demonstrations, led by groups like Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), erupted on campuses across the country. These protests condemned Israel’s actions and called for solidarity with the Palestinian people.

For Israeli leaders, the rise of such movements on American soil presents a new challenge. Traditionally, Israel has enjoyed strong bipartisan support in the U.S., but recent years have seen a shift, particularly among younger Americans, who are increasingly critical of Israeli policies in Gaza and the West Bank.

A New Strategy: Considering Intelligence Operations in the U.S.

The rising tide of pro-Palestinian activism has prompted some within Israel’s government to consider a controversial response: intelligence operations targeting American citizens. According to reports from the Israeli newspaper The Marker, Israel’s Minister of Diaspora Affairs, Amichai Chikli, held a secret meeting in October 2023 with Dan Zorla, the CEO of Black Cube, a private Israeli intelligence firm.

The alleged purpose of the meeting was to propose a covert operation to gather intelligence on SJP and other pro-Palestinian groups active on U.S. campuses. The Israeli government reportedly viewed these groups as a threat, both in terms of their potential to sway American public opinion and in their alleged promotion of anti-Semitism.

According to sources, Chikli’s proposal was that Black Cube would conduct the operation on behalf of the Israeli government, but in such a way that it would not be officially attributed to the state of Israel. This would theoretically protect the Israeli government from accusations of spying on U.S. soil, an act that could severely strain diplomatic relations with Washington.

Risks and Consequences

The potential use of a private intelligence firm to target American citizens poses significant risks, both diplomatically and legally. Such an operation would likely be perceived by the U.S. government as a violation of American sovereignty and could damage the longstanding relationship between the two countries. Furthermore, the revelations surrounding this meeting come with echoes of the 1987 Jonathan Pollard affair, in which an American citizen was convicted of spying for Israel. Following Pollard’s conviction, the Israeli government assured the U.S. that it would not engage in espionage activities on American soil in the future.

However, despite the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs’ official denial that such an operation was ever greenlit, multiple sources indicate that discussions did indeed take place. It remains unclear whether the operation will proceed, but the fact that the idea was even considered raises serious ethical and strategic questions for Israel.

For Black Cube, a company known for its complex intelligence operations often conducted on behalf of legal clients, the risks of involvement in such an operation could be significant. According to reports, Black Cube ultimately declined to proceed with the operation, fearing it could harm the company’s reputation and jeopardize its ability to operate in the U.S. in the future.

The Broader Implications for U.S.-Israel Relations

If Israel were to move forward with intelligence operations targeting American citizens, the fallout could be severe. Such actions would almost certainly be viewed as a breach of trust, particularly given the historical assurances Israel has made to the U.S. regarding espionage. Furthermore, the optics of spying on pro-Palestinian student groups, many of which are led by young American citizens, could exacerbate the already growing divide between American public opinion and Israeli policy.

At a time when the U.S. is dealing with complex international challenges, including the war in Ukraine and tensions with China, any further strain in the U.S.-Israel relationship could have wide-reaching consequences. Additionally, if Israeli intelligence operations were to be exposed, it could ignite a firestorm of political and legal repercussions in the U.S.

The October 7 attacks by Hamas have exposed significant vulnerabilities in Israel’s intelligence apparatus, raising serious questions about how one of the world’s most advanced intelligence systems could have failed so profoundly. At the same time, Israel now faces new challenges, as pro-Palestinian sentiment grows among American citizens. In response, some Israeli officials have reportedly considered launching intelligence operations on U.S. soil, a move that could have far-reaching consequences for the U.S.-Israel relationship.

As Israel grapples with the aftermath of the Hamas attack and the shifting tides of public opinion in the U.S., the stakes are higher than ever. The coming months will be critical in determining how Israel adapts to these challenges and whether it can avoid further missteps that could jeopardize its standing both at home and abroad.

ISIS’s Cyber Nightmare: How Misinformation and Hacktivists are Fueling Paranoia Among Jihadis

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ISIS Urges Followers to Use Only Official Channels Amid Cyber Warfare and Misinformation Campaigns

The terrorist organization ISIS has issued a directive to its supporters, instructing them to rely solely on its “official” communication channels. This announcement comes in response to a series of spoof propaganda efforts and cyberattacks launched by international intelligence agencies.

In a message disseminated through the group’s Nashir News Agency on the encrypted messaging app Telegram, ISIS expressed alarm over the proliferation of fake news attributed to the organization. The announcement emphasized that the Nashir News Agency does not have accounts on platforms such as Twitter, Instagram, or WhatsApp. It further stated that no legitimate accounts provide links apart from those officially associated with Nashir.

“We also caution against any account claiming to be affiliated with the publisher of Nashir News… the specialized agency to publish all that is officially issued by the Islamic State,” the message added.

The Nashir News Agency has been a key outlet for disseminating ISIS propaganda, including text, video, and photo reports from militants in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Egypt, and other regions. It also publishes material aimed at inspiring and instructing followers to commit acts of global terrorism. Each post on Telegram typically garners thousands of views and is often translated and further spread across mainstream websites and social media platforms by ISIS supporters worldwide.

Rise of Misinformation and Internal Strife

Recently, there has been a noticeable increase in fake ISIS propaganda, leading to paranoia and infighting among jihadis. Daeshgram, a group of Iraqi activists, played a significant role in this development by creating a spoof version of ISIS’s weekly newsletter, Al Naba. This fake newsletter, distributed via an official-looking Telegram account, featured a doctored image of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi surrounded by female dancers and an article on a fictional ISIS team participating in the World Cup.

Daeshgram claimed to have infiltrated over 120 ISIS-affiliated Telegram groups to spread confusion and mistrust using the counterfeit Al Naba issue. “Many members who used to trust one another are fighting in their groups and blaming one another,” an activist told The Independent. Upon realizing they were being targeted, some members became fearful, suspecting that their devices might have been infected with malware. “Our operation is continuing, but we have already achieved our goal to confuse and scare ISIS members and make them doubt each other in a place on the internet where they thought they were untouchable,” the activist added.

ISIS’s propaganda materials, including videos and documents, have been linked to terrorists who carried out deadly attacks in the UK, as well as “self-radicalized” extremists who have been jailed for planning attacks. The group’s focus on creating a “virtual caliphate” is seen as an attempt to maintain influence despite significant territorial losses in Iraq and Syria. The sophistication of their propaganda campaigns has been cited as a key factor in attracting an unprecedented number of foreign recruits.

Target of Global Cyber Efforts

Given its effective use of propaganda, ISIS has become a focal point for both international intelligence agencies and activists working to disrupt its messaging. Earlier this year, GCHQ, the UK’s intelligence and security organization, disclosed that it had initiated a “major offensive cyber campaign” against ISIS, which likely included the creation of fake propaganda.

Jeremy Fleming, the Director of GCHQ, noted that ISIS had harnessed the power of online communications to “radicalize and scare” in a way no previous terrorist group had. “They know potential sympathizers react well to slickly produced, unfiltered videos and magazines that can be downloaded and watched on smartphones, and they know which platforms to use to reach them,” Fleming explained. He further mentioned that the impact of ISIS’s approach has been felt across Europe, including attacks in London and Manchester.

Fleming elaborated that agents at GCHQ and the Ministry of Defence had successfully suppressed ISIS propaganda, impeded the group’s ability to coordinate attacks, and safeguarded coalition forces on the battlefield. “In 2017, there were times when Daesh found it almost impossible to spread their hate online, to use their normal channels to spread their rhetoric, or trust their publications,” he added.

In April, British intelligence, alongside US and European allies, launched a new wave of attacks targeting ISIS’s online platforms, including Amaq, al-Bayan radio, Halummu, and Nashir news websites. Europol stated that ISIS’s capacity to distribute and publicize terrorist content had been “compromised” through a combination of cooperation with internet service providers and cyberattacks. Security services are also working to identify ISIS administrators and radicalized individuals across Europe and beyond using the data retrieved from these operations.

Recent court cases have brought to light that British intelligence agents have been posing as ISIS fighters and propagandists on Telegram and other platforms to gather intelligence on terrorists who believe them to be like-minded extremists.

Evolution of ISIS’s Propaganda Network

When ISIS declared its “caliphate” in early 2014, it was openly publishing propaganda on mainstream social networks and websites, while many foreign fighters became known for documenting their activities on Twitter and blogs. The scale and complexity of the group’s propaganda network were unprecedented, with content available in nearly a dozen languages through websites, social media, automated emails, dedicated apps, and internet browser extensions.

However, intensified efforts to detect and remove such content have forced ISIS into increasingly obscure corners of the internet. Despite this, experts warn that ISIS’s propaganda network, although under significant pressure and facing territorial losses in Syria and Iraq, has already gained a dangerous level of ideological notoriety worldwide.

Raffaello Pantucci, Director of International Security Studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London, noted that the group continues to migrate across various platforms.

“Clearly there’s a real question of integrity around their material, and they’re stuck in a situation where no one necessarily trusts it anymore,” he told The Independent.

While acknowledging the importance of disrupting ISIS’s propaganda, Pantucci cautioned against underestimating the group’s resilience. “You can’t kid yourself that this will go away… the real threat comes from the fact there are angry people who are unhappy with governance in parts of the world,” he said.

Pantucci also pointed out that ISIS, which often publishes idealized depictions of life under its rule alongside gruesome footage of executions and battles, is attempting to “project an image of normality” despite its territorial setbacks. He questioned the extent to which the group could compensate for its battlefield losses through its online presence alone, asking, “If they continue to fail on the battlefield, how much can they make up for it with a Telegram account?”

Conclusion

The ongoing battle against ISIS’s propaganda machine involves a multi-faceted approach combining cyberattacks, misinformation campaigns, and intelligence gathering. While these efforts have led to disruptions in ISIS’s ability to operate online, the group’s ideological reach remains a significant concern. Continued vigilance and innovative strategies will be required to counteract the evolving threat posed by ISIS’s propaganda and recruitment tactics.

A Timeline of the New Assets

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The Ongoing Relationship Between American Right-Wing Influencers and Russian Propaganda Farms

In recent years, the intricate web of Russian interference in Western democracies has continued to unravel, revealing a broad spectrum of financial and political influences. The Tenet Media Russian money scandal stands out as one of the more complex and covert operations in this ongoing saga. Tenet Media, a prominent media conglomerate, was thrust into the spotlight when a series of investigations revealed it had unknowingly accepted substantial financial investments linked to Russian oligarchs and entities under the influence of the Kremlin. These revelations ignited widespread concern about foreign influence on Western media and exposed how financial networks can be manipulated for strategic geopolitical gains.

The scandal began to surface in early 2023 when investigative journalists discovered unusual financial patterns involving Tenet Media. Tracing these funds back to their origins, they uncovered a network of offshore companies and financial transactions that pointed to Russian interests. Initial reports hinted that Tenet Media had been receiving indirect funding from entities connected to sanctioned Russian oligarchs, raising questions about the motivations behind these investments and whether they were intended to sway public opinion through media channels. This revelation triggered a chain of events that led to a full-scale investigation, involving multiple governments, financial institutions, and media watchdogs, all aiming to uncover the extent of Russian influence on Tenet Media’s operations.

As the investigations deepened, more startling details emerged. Key figures within Tenet Media were found to have had meetings and established relationships with individuals tied to Russian intelligence and financial networks. Leaked documents revealed that these relationships were not coincidental but were part of a coordinated effort to build soft power influence in Western media. One of the major turning points came when emails from a high-ranking Tenet executive were leaked, suggesting awareness of the questionable origins of some of their funding sources. This leak not only fueled public outcry but also led to intensified scrutiny from regulatory bodies.

The implications of the scandal were vast. For Tenet Media, it meant a substantial loss of credibility, the resignation of several top executives, and the implementation of new, stricter compliance measures to prevent such a breach of trust from recurring. For the wider media landscape, it underscored the vulnerability of even well-established media organizations to covert foreign influence operations. Governments and financial institutions responded by tightening regulations around foreign investments in media companies, ensuring greater transparency and accountability.

The timeline that follows chronicles the key events of the Tenet Media Russian money scandal, detailing the investigation’s progression, the critical moments that shaped public understanding, and the broader implications for media integrity and geopolitical dynamics. From the first whispers of suspicious financial activity to the fallout that ensued, the timeline provides a comprehensive look at how a single media company became entangled in the complex web of international politics and espionage.

The Simplified Timeline (So Far):

February 2022:

Russia invades Ukraine.
This invasion prompts a global response, including extensive sanctions targeting Russian state-controlled entities such as RT (Russia Today). These sanctions are intended to isolate Russia economically and politically on the international stage.

October 2023:

RT begins covertly funneling money to a U.S. media company.
RT, seeking to circumvent the sanctions and influence American public opinion, secretly transfers nearly $10 million to a Tennessee-based media company identified as U.S. Company-1. This company’s operations are designed to subtly promote pro-Russian narratives and undermine U.S. credibility.

November 2023:

Launch of Tenet Media.
U.S. Company-1 rebrands itself as Tenet Media. The company starts an aggressive social media campaign, posting content on platforms such as TikTok, Instagram, X (formerly Twitter), and YouTube. The content often features anti-Ukrainian and anti-American themes, aligning with RT’s covert objectives.

March 2024:

Moscow music venue terrorist attack.
A terrorist attack occurs at a music venue in Moscow, causing significant casualties. The indictment alleges that RT operatives directed Tenet Media to propagate false narratives blaming Ukraine and the U.S. for the attack. This disinformation aims to create division and alter public perception in both Russia and the U.S.

May 22, 2023:

Tenet Media’s rebranding.
The company formally adopts a new name and identity to better align with its covert mission. This rebranding effort is a part of a broader strategy to disguise the company’s origins and operations.

August 2024:

Financial details of the scandal are revealed.
It is disclosed that RT’s financial support to U.S. Company-1 totals approximately $9.7 million, which constitutes nearly 90% of the company’s bank deposits. This financial dependence highlights the extent of RT’s control over the media operations and its significant influence on the company’s content.

Early September 2024:

Indictment unsealed.
The indictment against RT employees Konstantin Kalashnikov and Elena Afanasyeva is made public by the Southern District of New York. The charges include conspiracy to violate the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The indictment reveals the use of fake identities and shell companies to obscure the source of the funds and the manipulation of public opinion.

Mid-September 2024:

RT operatives remain at large.
The indictment details that Konstantin Kalashnikov and Elena Afanasyeva are fugitives. The authorities are actively seeking their apprehension. The case is a significant example of how foreign actors attempt to infiltrate and influence U.S. media and public discourse.
Influencers and media figures associated with Tenet Media, including Tim Pool, Benny Johnson, Dave Rubin, and Lauren Southern, publicly react to the scandal. They claim ignorance of the true origins of their funding and express shock at the revelations. This public reaction highlights the complexity and far-reaching impact of the scandal on individuals and media platforms involved.

Tim Pool’s official response after days of mocking the allegations with sarcastic comments about flipping his allegiance to Ukraine

The Tenet Media Russian money scandal serves as a stark reminder of the pervasive and sophisticated nature of modern geopolitical influence operations. What began as a seemingly innocuous flow of investment into a media company turned out to be part of a broader strategy by Russian interests to subtly shape narratives and influence public opinion in the West. The scandal highlights how vulnerable even established media companies can be to covert financial manipulations, especially in an era where information is a powerful tool in the geopolitical arena.

Throughout the unfolding of the scandal, several lessons have become evident. First and foremost is the critical importance of transparency and due diligence in media financing. The Tenet Media case has demonstrated that without rigorous scrutiny of funding sources, media organizations risk becoming unwitting vehicles for foreign influence. This realization has led to a much-needed reassessment of regulatory frameworks governing foreign investments in media, pushing for more stringent checks and balances to safeguard media independence and integrity.

Another key takeaway is the evolving nature of state influence campaigns. The use of offshore accounts, shell companies, and intermediaries to mask the true origins of funds reflects a shift from more overt forms of propaganda to subtler, more insidious methods of shaping the information environment. This approach not only makes it harder to detect and counter such operations but also complicates the legal and ethical landscape for media organizations that must navigate these murky waters.

For Tenet Media, the fallout has been both swift and severe. The loss of public trust, the resignation of high-level executives, and the imposition of new compliance protocols are just the beginning of a long road to rebuilding credibility. While the company has taken steps to rectify its mistakes, the scandal will likely cast a long shadow over its operations for years to come.

At a broader level, the scandal has underscored the need for a coordinated global response to counter foreign influence in media. Governments, regulatory bodies, and the media industry itself must work together to ensure that such breaches of trust are prevented in the future. The Tenet Media case has set a precedent that will inform future policies and strategies, reminding us that in the information age, the battle for hearts and minds is fought not just with facts and narratives but also with the financial flows that underpin them.

In the end, the Tenet Media Russian money scandal is not just a story of one company’s failure to guard against covert influence; it is a cautionary tale for the entire media landscape. It reveals the complexities of navigating a world where economic and informational warfare are increasingly intertwined, demanding vigilance, integrity, and collaboration to preserve the principles of free and independent media.

US and UK Intelligence Chiefs Embrace Generative AI for Enhanced Operations

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CIA Director Bill Burns and MI6 Chief Richard Moore Discuss How AI is Revolutionizing Intelligence Gathering and Global Security

In a joint declaration on collaboration between their agencies, CIA Director Bill Burns and MI6 Chief Richard Moore have outlined the role of artificial intelligence (AI) in addressing contemporary security threats.

In an op-ed for the Financial Times, Burns and Moore revealed that both agencies are actively employing generative AI to bolster intelligence operations, particularly in managing vast amounts of data. “We are now using AI, including generative AI, to enable and improve intelligence activities—from summarization to ideation to helping identify key information in a sea of data,” they wrote.

The intelligence chiefs also emphasized the use of AI to protect their agencies’ operations. They noted that they are training AI systems to conduct “red teaming” exercises to rigorously test their activities and ensure operational security.

Burns and Moore underscored the transformative impact of technology on the geopolitical landscape, citing the war in Ukraine as a prominent example where satellite imagery, drone technology, cyber warfare, and information operations are converging on an unprecedented scale. “This conflict has demonstrated that technology, deployed alongside extraordinary bravery and traditional weaponry, can alter the course of war,” they stated.

Beyond Ukraine, the CIA and MI6 are actively cooperating to counter Russian disinformation campaigns and what they describe as a “reckless campaign of sabotage across Europe.”

Russia’s utilization of generative AI is also evolving rapidly. Last week, the U.S. Department of Justice seized more than 30 websites operated by Russian actors as part of a misinformation campaign using AI to target American citizens ahead of the 2024 elections.

Additionally, the South China Morning Post recently reported that Russia is coordinating with China on the military applications of AI, including discussions about lethal autonomous weapons systems and other advanced military technologies.

China’s approach to generative AI presents a distinct set of challenges. According to a February 2024 testimony by the RAND Corporation to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China is expected to integrate generative AI into its cyber-enabled influence operations. RAND alleges that the Chinese military, particularly the People’s Liberation Army, plans to employ AI for social media manipulation and election interference.

Both MI6 and the CIA have identified China as “the principal intelligence and geopolitical challenge of the 21st century.” The intelligence leaders emphasized that their agencies are not navigating this technological landscape alone; they are partnering with innovative companies across the United States, the United Kingdom, and globally to maintain a competitive technological advantage.

While this joint disclosure from Burns and Moore provides important insights into the evolving use of AI in intelligence, it is important to recognize that the exploration of AI applications within intelligence agencies is not new. In July, Lakshmi Raman, the CIA’s Director of Artificial Intelligence Innovation, spoke at an Amazon Web Services Summit about the agency’s use of generative AI for content triage and analytical support. “We were captured by the generative AI zeitgeist just like the entire world was a couple of years back,” Raman said, according to NextGov.

“We’ve also had a lot of success with generative AI, and we have leveraged generative AI to help us classify and triage open-source events to help us search and discover and do levels of natural language query on that data.”

AI companies like OpenAI and Palantir have also been forging agreements with various government agencies to provide AI services that enhance their capabilities. This marks a significant trend; according to a report by the Brookings Institution, federal agencies have increased their potential awards to private tech contracts by almost 1,200%, from $355 million to $4.6 billion during the period studied.

Michael Flynn’s Sentencing Date Set

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The Fourth Victim of the Mueller Investigation Will Be Sentenced in January

More than two years after former Trump national security advisor Michael Flynn’s guilty plea, there is finally a date set for Flynn’s sentencing. On January 28, 2020, almost three years to the date after committing the crime for which he’s charged, Flynn will be sentenced. Flynn was charged with “willfully and knowingly [making] false, fictitious and fraudulent statements and representations” to the FBI regarding his conversations with Russian ambassador to the U.S., Sergey Kislyak in 2017.

The sentencing has been delayed due to Flynn’s defense lawyers claiming prosecutors violated a rule requiring them to disclose evidence to defendants that could exonerate him. Flynn repeatedly requested to compel prosecutors to turn over additional evidence that he claims would cause the charge against him to be dismissed. Judge Emmet Sullivan, the federal judge assigned to the trial, said on Monday that the defense team failed to establish a single violation by the prosecution.

Sullivan said in his ruling in the U.S. District Court in D.C., Flynn’s lawyers “failed to explain” how most of the information that had not already been turned over to them is relevant to the crime to which Flynn admitted under oath on December 1, 2017. Sullivan also noted he had ethical concerns with the legal brief submitted by Flynn’s defense team as part of the motions for evidence because it “lifted verbatim portions from a source without attribution.

Now that we finally have a sentencing date for Michael Flynn, he can finally put a bow on what has been a very long couple of years for Michael Flynn and his family. While much of the trouble started shortly after leaving the DIA and forming an independent lobby group, the real trouble began in December 2016.

December, 2016

Flynn became part of the federal investigation known as Crossfire Hurricane, which was later taken over by Special Counsel Robert Mueller, after the FBI intercepted communications between Flynn and then-Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak. The matter was immediately folded into the FBI’s probe into Russian election interference into the 2016 election. The reason the communication was significant is because it took place on the same day the Obama administration unveiled sanctions against Russia for election-related hacking.

The very next day, December 30, 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin said he wouldn’t retaliate against the United States for the sanctions, then boasted about inviting U.S. embassy children to a Christmas party. A move the was praised by then-president-elect Donald Trump over Twitter.

January, 2017

In January of 2017, Donald Trump made a statement to the media claiming that no member of his cabinet had any communication with Russia during the campaign. The very next day, Washington Post columnist David Ignatius first reported the story about Flynn’s communication with Kislyak, raising questions in the public about what was discussed during the conversation.

On January 13, future White House Press Secretary and White House Communications Director Sean Spicer was asked about the call. Spicer claimed there was no discussion about the sanctions during the call to Ambassador Kislyak, and that the point of the call was to schedule a post-inauguration meeting between Trump and Putin.

On January 15, Mike Pence said on Face the Nation, “It was strictly coincidental that they had a conversation. They did not discuss anything having to do with the United States’ decision to expel diplomats or impose censure against Russia.”

On January 21, Flynn was first questioned by the FBI about his call to Kislyak as part of the larger Russia probe, where Flynn denied the subject of the phone call being related to sanctions. Only days later, Sean Spicer was questioned again about Flynn’s call to the ambassador, where he said Flynn reassured him the previous night that the subject of the phone call had nothing to do with sanctions. The only subjects of the call included a plane crash over the weekend, the exchanging of holiday greetings, a possible conference in Syria, and, again, setting up a meeting with President Vladimir Putin.

On January 26, 2017, then-acting Attorney General Sally Yates informed White House Counsel Don McGahn of everything she knew about the call, and said she felt Flynn was “essentially blackmailed by the Russians.” Yates later told a Senate judiciary subcommittee, “We believed that Gen. Flynn was compromised with respect to the Russians.” The administration allegedly started an internal investigation that very day. Yates was fired from the administration days later on January 30. The reason for her dismissal was allegedly her refusal to work with or support Donald Trump on his “Muslim ban.”

February, 2017

A week and a half later, The Washington Post reported that according to current and former U.S. officials – likely Yates – that Flynn did discuss sanctions on the call with the Russian ambassador. The next day on February 10, a spokesperson told NBC News that Flynn “can’t be 100 percent sure” about whether or not he talked about sanctions, but he doesn’t remember doing so. At this point, Trump all but gave away his knowledge of the real subject of the call by putting distance between Flynn and himself. “I don’t know about it. I haven’t seen it. What report is that?” Trump said to reporters.

On February 13, 2017, Trump advisor Kellyanne Conway said in an NBC interview that Flynn had the full confidence of the president. Hours later, Flynn resigned from his position in the Trump cabinet, saying he “inadvertently briefed Vice President Mike Pence and others with incomplete information regarding his phone calls with the Russian ambassador.”

March, 2017

On March 9, 2017, Flynn retroactively registered with the Justice Department as a foreign agent, disclosing $530,000 worth of lobbying money he was paid to help Turkish interests in the United States. This is because after leaving the DIA, Flynn formed the Flynn Intel Group. During 2015 and 2016, Flynn developed a relationship with with Ekim Alptekin, and Turkish businessman with deep ties to the Kremlin, and was hired to lobby on behalf of Turkish interests. It is believed his ties to Turkish interests played a part in Flynn advising President Trump not to use U.S. dollars to help arm Kurds in Syria due to their long-standing conflict with Turkey. We all know how that turned out earlier this year for the Northern Syrians.

Soon after, documents were released by the House Oversight Committee that Flynn was paid $45,000 plus perks by the state-sponsored Russian television network RT, or Russian Television, to speak at an anniversary gala in December of 2015. A gala also attended by then Green Party presidential candidate Jill Stein.

May, 2017

The Senate Intelligence Committee soon requested testimony from Flynn. Flynn’s defense team requested immunity in exchange for Flynn’s testimony, but the request was denied by the committee. On May 11, Flynn was officially subpoenaed by the committee, requesting documents relevant to its investigation into Russian meddling in the 2016 election. One week later, Deputy U.S. Attorney General Rod Rosenstein officially appointed former FBI Director Robert Mueller as special counsel to oversee the investigation into Russian interference. Soon after, Flynn’s attorneys refused to comply with the Senate Intelligence Committee subpoena, citing Flynn’s Fifth Amendment right to not incriminate himself.

September, 2017

In September of 2017, Flynn’s son also became a part of the probe into Russian election interference because of his role in his father’s Flynn Intel Group and its ties to Kremlin-connected business associates. This, of course, became part of the investigation after the elder Flynn filed with the Justice Department and disclosed his business ties.

October, 2017

A little more than a month later, Former CIA Director James Woolsey was interviewed by federal agents working on behalf of Special Counsel Mueller, into allegations that Flynn had discussed the illegal removal of a Turkish cleric from the United States. Mueller found that both Flynn and his son were to be paid upwards of $15 million to deliver Fethullah Gulen, a Muslim cleric living in the U.S., to Turkey for prosecution. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had previously pressed the U.S. government to extradite him, but neither administration involved would cooperate with the request, as Gulen would become another political prisoner of the Turkish government.

Bureau agents learned of a December 2016 meeting at the 21 Club in New York, where Flynn and Turkish government representatives discussed removing Gulen by essentially kidnapping him, then flying him via private jet to the Turkish prison island of Imrali. This was according to at least four individuals the FBI interviewed about the meeting, as well as the plan moving forward.

November, 2017

On November 10, five days after federal investigators concluded the evidence was sufficient to bring charges against Flynn and his son, federal investigators began to examine whether Flynn’s meeting with Turkish representatives also included a possible quid pro quo deal with Turkey where he would be paid secretly through his organization to carry out directives from the Turkish capital of Ankara while in the White House. In the meantime, Mueller continued to investigate the Flynn Intel Group and its failure to proactively disclose its work with foreign governments. As of November 22, Iranian-American Bijan Kian became a subject of the investigation due to ties with the group.

Kian was later found guilty by a jury for illegally acting as a foreign agent, and conspiring to keep his and the Flynn Intel Group’s work hidden from the Justice Department. The verdict was thrown out by the judge in the trial, however, citing insufficient evidence.

December, 2017

On December 1, 2017, Flynn finally entered a guilty plea on the charge of providing false information to the FBI in regards to his communication with Russia, bringing a very small part of a very large investigation to an end. It should be noted that Special Counsel Robert Mueller did recommend Flynn be given a light sentence because of his long-term cooperation during the Russia investigation, where Flynn apparently provided very valuable information to federal authorities. Updates soon to come after Flynn’s sentencing hearing.

Additional Reading: https://www.stripes.com/news/us/michael-flynn-s-sentencing-set-after-judge-rejects-his-attacks-on-the-fbi-justice-department-1.611431 https://www.axios.com/mueller-russia-investigation-timeline-indictments-70433acd-9ef7-424d-aa01-b962ae5c9647.html https://www.vox.com/2018/12/4/18124615/michael-flynn-mueller-sentencing-memo-cooperation https://www.vox.com/2018/12/4/18124615/michael-flynn-mueller-sentencing-memo-cooperation https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/16/judge-to-sentence-former-trump-aide-michael-flynn-in-january.html https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/mike-flynn-timeline-his-rise-fall-russia-call-n720671 https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/24/politics/bijan-kian-verdict-thrown-out/index.html

China and the CIA

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Why is China Winning the War Against U.S. Intelligence?

China is the world’s most populous country with a population of 1,420,062,000 citizens as of early 2019. The size of their population is dwarfed, however, by the size of their government. China is known to have an overreaching democratic dictatorship government, ruled by the communist party, whose constitution guarantees them exorbitant power over its citizens, including, but not limited to, their ability to limit even the number of children allowed per family.

With a government this overreaching, you would expect the Chinese government to be very intrusive to its own citizens, as well as foreign governments, with all of the wealth necessary to build a very one of the world’s largest national security establishments. Within this apparatus are several of the world’s most powerful and secretive clandestine agencies. Namely one: The Ministry of State Security or MSS.

It’s certainly nothing new for governments around the world to feel the presence of the agency, with increasing power and efficacy, as they did with the PLA prior. Over the last decade, though, the United States has been the priority target of China’s MSS, with increased hacking, civilian spy recruitment, and even recruitment within government agencies.

In January of 2018, Jerry Chun Shing Lee, a naturalized U.S. citizen and former CIA officer, was arrested at New York’s JFK International airport. At the time, Lee was in possession of several hand-written notes containing classified information, including the locations of covert facilities and operational meeting locations,the names and phone numbers of foreign assets and covert CIA employees, and even operational notes from asset meetings. In may of this year, Lee was sentenced to 19 years in prison after being convicted of one count of conspiracy to deliver national defense information to aid a foreign government and two counts of unlawfully retaining documents related to national defense.

Lee worked for the CIA from 1994 – 2007. Lee moved to Hong Kong after leaving the CIA, where he worked for Japan Tobacco International, a company formed in 1999 when Japan Tobacco Inc. purchased the international operations of R.J. Reynolds. In 2010, while working for the firm, Lee was approached by Chinese officials and offered an undisclosed sum of money to provide U.S. intelligence information, as well as sensitive company information to Chinese authorities. Shortly afterward, the Hong Kong company for whom he worked suspected Lee of sharing information regarding the company’s investigation into counterfeiting and smuggling. A former manager of Lee’s had this to say to the South China Morning Post in 2018:

“While at the time we could not prove it, we suspected he was leaking the details of our investigations into counterfeiting and smuggling – including those conducted in cooperation with Western law enforcement agencies and targeting highly sophisticated organised crime syndicates and North Korea – to the mainland authorities. Several of the shipments of counterfeits purchased as part of the investigations were seized by the Chinese authorities or simply disappeared, and one of our contract investigators was arrested and imprisoned in China.”

After his termination from the company in 2012, Lee moved his family back to the United States. The family, while seeking permanent residence, frequented hotels in Virginia and Hawaii. Due to the association between Lee’s former employer and Western law enforcement, U.S. authorities were made aware of Lee’s dealings with Chinese authorities, which raised red flags because of Lee’s former association with the CIA.

Lee quickly came under investigation by federal law enforcement, and in time, during a search of the family’s hotel room, authorities found several day planners and a thumb drive containing sensitive and classified information that Lee had apparently compiled while still at the agency. While this is a crime on its own due to the agreement Lee had signed with the CIA upon his hire, this raised extra suspicions of federal law enforcement, the NSA, and the CIA. This is because of the time-frame between Lee moving to Hong Kong, to the time he returned to the United States – an important span of time for the United States Intelligence Community. Between 2010 – 2012, up to 20 CIA assets were imprisoned or killed by Chinese authorities, which was the worst intelligence disaster the United States had seen since the Aldrich Ames incident in the 1980s.

Problems were not over after Lee’s arrest and conviction, though. Last year, former CIA officer Kevin Mallory was arrested on charges of spying for the Chinese. Mallory was approached by a Chinese intel headhunter via LinkedIn in 2017. Chinese officials learned of Mallory’s $230,000 mortgage that was several months delinquent, along with several other delinquent bills and credit card debt. The Chinese headhunter offered to help pay off Mallory’s debt if he were to pass sensitive and classified information.

In March and April, Mallory traveled to Shanghai with the contact, Michael Yang, who claimed to work for a Chinese think tank. Mallory quickly assessed Yang to be a Chinese intelligence officer, however. At this time, Yang gave Mallory a covcom device in the form of an encrypted Samsung Galaxy smartphone to facilitate his communications with Yang. According to the FBI, Mallory used this device to transmit at least five U.S. government documents to Yang, one containing the identities of sources who had helped the U.S. government.

Mallory was sentenced in May of this year to 20 years in prison followed by five years of supervised release. Mallory’s and Lee’s sentences were not the only ones this year, though. In March of this year, former Defense Intelligence Agency officer Ron Hansen plead guilty to attempting to communicate, deliver, or transmit information involving the national defense of the United States to the People’s Republic of China.

Hansen was arrested in June of 2018 while en route to Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. He was scheduled to board a flight to China while in possession of classified military information he had planned to sell to agents of a Chinese intelligence service. As Hansen admitted, in early 2014, Chinese intelligence targeted him for recruitment, after which time he started meeting with them in China on a regular basis. During the first of these meetings, the agents outlined precisely what kind of information they would consider valuable to Chinese intelligence. Hansen then offered to deliver the information for a some of money that added up to hundreds of thousands of dollars between May 24, 2016 and June 2, 2018.

While Hansen previously had clearance for highly classified information, after leaving the agency, however, he lost his clearance, as most do. Hansen used his relationship with a DIA case officer who still worked for the agency, and acted as a conduit between the officer and Chinese intelligence representatives. Hansen advised the case officer how to record and transmit classified information in a manner that would avoid detection, and also advised the case officer how to hide and launder any financial compensation received for the information.

Unknown to Hansen at the time, the case officer reported Hansen’s behavior to higher-ups within the DIA, and not long after, agreed to act as a confidential source for the FBI during the investigation into Hansen. Hansen met with the case officer on June 2, 2018, and was handed documents containing sensitive and highly classified information related to national security and regional U.S. military readiness. As mentioned before, he was arrested later on that day, and the information never made it to his Chinese intelligence contacts.

Three arrests of former CIA and DIA officers in one year for violations of the espionage act is certainly an alarming uptick. There has also been a large increase in Chinese hacking. According to CrowdStrike co-founder Dmitri Alperovitch, “We have seen [the Ministry of State Security], over the years, break into corporate organizations. They were always better technically than the PLA (People’s Liberation Army).” He continued about the recent increase in MSS hacking, “We’re seeing, on a weekly basis, intrusions into U.S. and other Western companies from Chinese actors.” This is, of course, in violation of the 2015 agreement between the U.S. and China, not to conduct cyber-enabled spying or intellectual property theft.

There has also been an uptick in the amount of non-government employees, foreign visitors, foreign nationals, and U.S. citizens accused of spying. In March of this year, Chinese businesswoman Yujing Zhang unlawfully made her way into Mar-A-Lago – President Trump’s Florida resort – carrying multiple electronics in her purse, such as encrypted thumb drives, allegedly with the intent of collecting sensitive information about President Trump and other government matters through resort computers. Zhang was not convicted of spying, as prosecutors could not prove her intent, but she was convicted of trespassing and lying to federal agents, after changing her story about why she was at the resort several times. Zhang has since been reported after receiving time served on an eight-month sentence of incarceration.

As recently as September of this year, two Chinese diplomats were expelled to the Chinese Embassy in Washington after trespassing onto a sensitive military base in Virginia. This is the first incident of its kind since 1987. It is believed by officials that at least one of the two diplomats was an intelligence officer working under diplomatic cover. The diplomats, accompanied by their wives attempted entry at the base’s checkpoint. Due to lack of clearance, they were instructed to enter, turn around, and leave, but the diplomats ignored instructions and continued onto the base. They were then pursued by military personnel, but continued to evade authorities until their path was blocked by firetrucks. Due to diplomatic immunity, charges were not filed, but the individuals have officially been expelled to their embassy. Steps were also taken to vastly increase restrictions on Chinese diplomats in October. Chinese diplomats must now provide previous notice before meeting with state or local officials, and before visiting educational and research institutions. China has since claimed the incident was a misunderstanding, and the expulsion of the diplomats is a mistake on behalf of the U.S.

Also in September, naturalized U.S. citizen and California resident, Xuehua Peng was taken into custody after an FBI sting that lasted more than two years. Peng, who went by Edward, was charged with acting as an illegal agent of a foreign government. Peng allegedly worked as an intermediary passing classified information and collecting payments between intelligence agents. Peng used a classical spy tactic known as dead-drops – a tactic where information, money or other products are left at one of multiple predetermined locations which are usually marked by something as a signal, such as a chalk line or discreet symbol of some kind. The agent that communicated with Peng on behalf of the MSS was a double agent working for the FBI, and collected evidence on Peng for over two years. Peng has not yet been convicted, but the officials allege the evidence collected by the FBI during the investigation is irrefutable.

These are only a few cases from 2019 alone, and one must wonder, as President Trump’s trade war with China continues to escalate, how far will China go to spy on U.S. and other Western companies and governments. Even if China and the U.S. have reached a small deal providing some relief on Chinese tariffs, we remain economic competitors on the global scale, and who knows what sanctions may happen as a result of China’s current crackdown on Hong Kong. In a time when Russia is running vast networks of disinformation campaigns and pumping millions of illegal dollars into political campaigns, the uptick in Chinese spying is more than alarming.

Additional Reading: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-cia-officer-sentenced-prison-espionage https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-intelligence-officer-convicted-attempted-espionage-sentenced-10-years-federal-prison https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/former-cia-officer-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-commit-espionage https://www.cyberscoop.com/ministry-of-state-security-china-hacking-department-of-justice-indictment/ https://www.cyberscoop.com/ministry-of-state-security-china-hacking-department-of-justice-indictment/ https://abcnews.go.com/US/fbi-employee-arrested-allegedly-acting-secret-chinese-agent/story?id=41045611

A Pattern of Attacks

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Deep State Conspiracies and Trump’s On-Going Grudge Against the United States Intelligence Community

And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall set you free.
John 8:32

I’m not a religious person. I leave that sort of thing to the theologians. However, the quote above cannot be questioned as a positive biblical quote. This quote is not only important to the theologians or the religious of the world, but it’s also important to the men and women who serve their country as part of the Central Intelligence Agency, as the CIA’s motto, carved into a wall at the George H.W. Bush Center for Intelligence in Langley, Virginia.

It would appear this quote would be contrary to everything the CIA stands for. Isn’t the CIA a super secret organization of spies that perform crazy experiments on people against their will, torture U.S. citizens, and spy on/overthrow foreign governments left and right to meet the American goal of world domination? Isn’t that where all of the aliens are hidden, along with all of Hillary Clinton’s spooky emails that reveal her secret identity as an evil space lizard? Well, until recently, it was only the movies or low resolution conspiracy documentaries on Youtube. This has unfortunately changed.

President Donald J. Trump has a long history of not only criticizing the I.C. for their inability to prosecute his political rivals’ so-called scandals involving deleted emails or alleged conspiracies at foreign embassies. He has also gone as far as spreading deep state conspiracy theories alleging bias against him, and outlandish CIA plots to remove him from office.

This behavior continued through this very week, months after Donald Trump instructed his own Justice Department to investigate the FBI for alleged political bias against him before and during the Trump-Russia probe, as part of a deep state conspiracy against him. If you’d like to read more about this, I wrote extensively on this earlier in the week. Read it here.

After the report was made public this week, Donald Trump continues to spread misinformation about contents and conclusions of the report, no matter what the Inspector General himself says about his office’s conclusions, or what the Director of the FBI says in response to the report. This behavior indicates that President Trump is intent on continuing to spread these Alex Jones-esque deep state conspiracy theories. Unfortunately, his base is comprised of so many of these lifelong Info Wars subscribers, and they eat this sort of things up. As if he could say the world is flat and the moon landing was a fake, and his base would cheer him even harder.

One must wonder where it ends. Likely the only way to find the answer to that question is the figure out where it began. President Trump has always had a penchant for the conspiratorial beliefs. Whether it was questioning Ted Cruz’s father’s involvement in the JFK assassination, claiming Justice Antonin Scalia was found with a pillow on his face, and trying to point to Democrats in an assassination plot, or even going as far back as bringing the Obama Birther movement from the outer reaches of the internet, to popular online forums such as Twitter.

Alex Jones During a Broadcast on Infowars.com

Why wouldn’t President Trump be hostile toward the USIC while believing in conspiracy theories like these? He has also been known to tune into, and even call into Info Wars. A webcast that has been known to spread such nonsense as the 9/11 attacks being an inside job, the existence of a secret resort where all world leaders meet once per year for orgies and human sacrifice, and even accusing the CIA of putting chemicals in the water that turn straight frogs into homosexuals. I’m really not making this up.

What do you think tap water is? It’s a gay bomb, baby. And I’m not saying people didn’t naturally have homosexual feelings. I’m not even getting into it, quite frankly. I mean, give me a break. Do you think I’m like, oh, shocked by it, so I’m up here bashing it because I don’t like gay people? I don’t like ’em putting chemicals in the water that turn the freakin’ frogs gay! Do you understand that? I’m sick of being social engineered, it’s not funny!
“Alex Jones Gay Bomb Rant”, October 16 2015

Unfortunately, Alex Jones’ conspiracy theories aren’t all comical. Alex is known for accusing survivors of school shootings of being crisis actors, and even spreading conspiracies about businesses running pedophile rings for high-ranking politicians in their basements. While the latter might sound comical, this very business was the victim of a shooting in December of 2016, perpetrated by a man who believed in the conspiracy theory spread by Jones to enough of a degree to kill over it.

This is a very dangerous precedent that is harmful to the American people in the hands of a popular internet personality, but it is far more dangerous in the hands of a President with a cult-like following. Just imagine if Donald Trump were to tweet something tomorrow that would perpetuate the 9/11 conspiracy. How long would it take before former President George W. Bush required enhanced police security, such as those men and women who testified in November’s impeachment inquiries after receiving death threats and being doxed online?

This, however, is little more dangerous than things President Trump has said and done in the past. It would follow his pattern of dishonesty against those who serve to protect our nation. It would be consistent with Donald Trump’s claim that Barack Obama should not be president because he was not born in the United States. A claim that moved the goal posts well into the ocean in their continuing demand for more and more evidence of Obama’s place of birth, even after the long-form birth certificate was put on a giant screen at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner.

President Trump has touted even more dangerous conspiracy theories over the years. In 2016 during a presidential debate, Donald Trump said to host Jake Tapper, ” “We had so many instances, people that work for me, just the other day, 2 years old, a beautiful child, went to have the vaccine and came back and a week later got a tremendous fever, got very, very sick, now is autistic,” The idea that vaccines are to blame for autism is long-debunked by every federal and state health organization in the United States, and in every other first world country. Yet these dangerous hypotheses, after bing repeated enough to an audience that seeks out boogiemen, have led to the return of Whooping Cough, Measles, Mumps, Tuberculosis, etc…

Donald Trump is a known climate change denialist, and has gone as far to publicly harass children online out of his hostility toward the science. Donald Trump has never had a great relationships with science, however. In a 1992 interview with New York Magazine, Donald Trump openly denied the validity of the scientific studies that ruled on the dangers of asbestos.

President Trump has gone as far as accuse others of murder in repeating conspiracy theories. Donald Trump has used the hashtag #ClintonBodyCount on several occasions. A hashtag that is in reference to a conspiracy theory that Hillary Clinton was somehow behind the death of DNC employee Seth Rich and the suicide of Deputy White House Counsel Vince Foster. This wasn’t the only time, of course. In November of 2017, Donald Trump tweeted, “So now that Matt Lauer is gone when will the Fake News practitioners at NBC be terminating the contract of Phil Griffin? And will they terminate low ratings Joe Scarborough based on the ‘unsolved mystery’ that took place in Florida years ago? Investigate!” A tweet in reference to yet another conspiracy theory that Morning Joe host Joe Scarborough murdered intern Lori Klausutis, while he was a Congressman for Florida’s First District.

What’s worse is Donald Trumjp’s history of rhetoric against Muslims in America and abroad. In November of 2017, Donald Trump tweeted three videos in the hopes of selectively verifying his anti-Muslim sentiments. The videos showed Muslims in Europe committing assaults on citizens and vandalism against “Christian icons.”

Donald Trump’s retweet of propaganda videos posted by members of Britain First, a known anti-Muslim organization.

After the propaganda videos were shared by Donald Trump, he was made aware of the origins of the videos, and the reputation of the group sharing them, which led to White House press secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders defending the president by saying the “origins of the videos doesn’t matter.”

After a history of repeating and popularizing conspiracy theories, no matter the consequences, it is no wonder President Trump has such little respect for the Intelligence Community. In fact, only days after his inauguration, Donald Trump’s actions displays just how much respect he has for the IC during a speech at the George H.W. Bush Center for Intelligence.

When President Trump stood in front of the CIA’s memorial wall in January of 2017, he spent the entirety of his speech bragging about himself, verbalizing a fictional narrative of a “landslide election,” and dishonestly exaggerating the size of his inauguration crowd. A series of blatantly lies in front of a wall of stars that individually represent men or women who died in the line of duty as members of the CIA. This was an act of disrespect that led to CIA employees leaving flowers at the wall weeks afterward, as a form of protest, apologizing to those lost for allowing President Trump to disgrace their names and legacies.

Such disrespect for our Intelligence Community at the very beginning of his term set the stage for a presidency wherein the IC is consistently held in contempt by the White House, and even many of the president’s appointees within the State Department. And never in my life have I seen a president with such little respect for the men and women who serve tirelessly to keep safe and preserve the freedoms we take for granted every day in the United States of America.

Republicans and the IG Report

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Media Bias and the Review of “Four” (One) FISA Application(s) and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane Investigation

“The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the OIG’s crucial independent oversight role and the thoroughness and professionalism your office brought to this work. The Report’s findings and recommendations represent constructive criticism that will make us stronger as an organization. We also appreciate the Report’s recognition that the FBI cooperated fully with this review and provided broad and timely access to all information requested by the OIG, including highly classified and sensitive material involving national security.

The Report concludes that the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane investigation and related investigations of certain individuals were opened in 2016 for an authorized purpose and with adequate factual predication. The Report also details instances in which certain FBI personnel, at times during the 2016-2017 period reviewed by the OIG, did not comply with existing policies, neglected to exercise appropriate diligence, or otherwise failed to meet the standard of conduct that the FBI expects of its employees — and that our country expects of the FBI. We are vested with significant authorities, and it is our obligation as public servants to ensure that these authorities are exercised with objectivity and integrity. Anything less falls short of the FBI’s duty to the American people.”

– Director Christopher Wray to Inspector General Horowitz

If the quote above confuses you, it may be because of the president’s, William Barr’s and the right-wing media’s representation of the investigation performed by the Inspector General’s office into the initial opening of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane investigation into possible Trump-Russia connections. A report that has been mischaracterized to insinuate the FBI’s investigation was based in left-wing bias, and was influenced by then-president Barack Obama. This, of course, couldn’t be further from the truth.

In multiple areas of the report, the findings clearly state that there was no wrong-doing or bias involved in the opening of the investigation. Also, judging by the results of the long-term investigation (over 40 indictments, many of whom members of Trump’s cabinet) one could say the investigation was obviously necessary. Yet, the media doesn’t seem to mention much of that. Here are some quotes from the actual report that you can download from this site in the Important Documents of 2019 tab.

“Crossfire Hurricane was opened as a Full Investigation and all of the senior FBI officials who participated in discussions about whether to open a case told us the information warranted opening it. For example, then Counterintelligence Division (CD) Assistant Director (AD) E.W. “Bill” Priestap, who approved the case opening, told us that the combination of the FFG information and the FBI’s ongoing cyber intrusion investigation of the July 2016 hacks of the Democratic National Committee’s (DNC) emails, created a counterintelligence concern that the FBI was “obligated” to investigate. Priestap stated that he considered whether the FBI should conduct defensive briefings for the Trump campaign but ultimately decided that providing such briefings created t he risk that “if someone on the campaign was engaged with the Russians, he/she would very likely change his/her tactics and/or otherwise seek to cover-up his/her activities, thereby preventing us from finding the truth.” We did not identify any Department or FBI policy that applied to this decision and therefore determined that the decision was a judgment call that Department and FBI policy leaves to the discretion of FBI officials. We also concluded that, under the AG Guidelines and the DIOG, the FBI had an authorized purpose when it opened Crossfire Hurricane to obtain information about, or protect against, a national security threat or federal crime, even though the investigation also had the potential to impact constitutionally protected activity.”
Page iii of the Executive Summary of the Report

Moving ahead a few pages, the report repeats its conclusion of there being no evidence of political bias in the opening of Crossfire Hurricane and the investigations into four individuals related to the Trump campaign.

“As discussed in Chapter Ten, we determined that, during the 2016 presidential campaign, the Crossfire Hurricane team tasked several CHSs, which resulted in multiple interactions with Carter Page and George Papadopoulos, both before and after they were affiliated with the Trump campaign, and one with a high-level Trump campaign official who was not a subject of the investigation. All of these CHS interactions were consensually monitored and recorded by the FBI. As noted above, under Department and FBI policy, the use of a CHS to conduct consensual monitoring is a matter of investigative judgment that, absent certain circumstances, can be authorized by a first-line supervisor (a supervisory special agent). We determined that the CHS operations conducted during Crossfire Hurricane received the necessary FBI approvals, and that AD Priestap knew about, and approved of, all of the Crossfire Hurricane CHS operations, even in circumstances where a first-level supervisory special agent could have approved the operations. We found no evidence that the FBI used CHSs or UCEs to interact with members of the Trump campaign prior to the opening of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. After the opening of the investigation, we found no evidence that the FBI placed any CHSs or UCEs within the Trump campaign or tasked any CHSs or UCEs to report on the Trump campaign. Finally, we also found no documentary or testimonial evidence that political bias or improper motivations influenced the FBI’s decision to use CHSs or UCEs to interact with Trump campaign officials in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation.”
Pages xvi – xvii of the Executive Summary

One must wonder, then, how did William Barr come to the conclusion he insisted upon during his summary of the report? We’re not even through the Executive Summary at this point, and we’ve already read twice that the Office of the Inspector General found no evidence of bias or wrong-doing when opening the investigation. Including his, and the right-wing media’s characterization of the initiation of the investigation essentially being a propaganda piece orchestrated by the Obama Administration, and the Clinton campaign. Here’s how the report details the reasons for the opening of the investigation:

“At the time the Crossfire Hurricane investigation was opened in July 2016, the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC), which includes the FBI, was aware of Russian efforts to interfere with the 2016 U.S. elections. The Russian efforts included cyber intrusions into various political organizations, including the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC). Throughout spring and early summer 2016, the FBI became aware of specific cyber intrusions for which the Russian government was responsible, through ongoing investigations into Russian hacking operations conducted by the FBI’s Cyber Division and the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division (CD).
In March and May 2016, FBI field offices identified a spear phishing campaign by the Russian military intelligence agency, known as the General Staff Intelligence Directorate (GRU), targeting email addresses associated with the DNC and the Hillary Clinton campaign, as well as efforts to place malware on DNC and DCCC computer networks. In June and July 2016, stolen materials were released online through the fictitious personas ‘Guccifer 2.0″ and “DCLeaks.” In addition, in late July 2016, WikiLeaks released emails obtained from DNC servers as part of its “Hillary Leak Series.’
By August 2016, the USIC assessed that in the weeks leading up to the 2016 U.S. elections, Russia was considering further intelligence operations to impact or disrupt the elections. In addition to the Russian infiltration of DNC and DCCC computer systems, between March and August 2016, the FBI became aware of numerous attempts to hack into state election systems. These included confirmed access into elements of multiple state or local electoral boards using tactics, techniques, and procedures associated with Russian state-sponsored actors. 163 The FBI learned that Russian efforts also included cyber-enabled scanning and probing of election related infrastructure in several states.
It was in this context that the FBI received information on July 28, 2016, about a conversation between Papadopoulos and an official of a Friendly Foreign Government (FFG) in May 2016 during which Papadopoulos ‘suggested the Trump team had received some kind of suggestion’ from Russia that it could assist this process with the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to candidate Clinton and President Obama. As described below, the FBI opened the Crossfire Hurricane investigation 3 days after receiving this information.”
Pages 49 – 50, Chapter Three of the IG Report

I may have missed the part where it said the investigation was a fraudulent orchestration of the Obama Administration and the Clinton campaign, but I may have missed it. I’ll read on. Here’s what the court said about the related investigations into Carter Page, Michael Flynn, Paul Manafort, and George Papadopoulos:

“The opening EC for the Carter Page investigation stated that there was an articulable factual basis that Carter Page ‘may wittingly or unwittingly be involved in activity on behalf of the Russian Federation which may constitute a federal crime or threat to the national security.’ The EC cross-referenced the predication for Crossfire Hurricane and stated that Page was a senior foreign policy adviser for the Trump campaign, had extensive ties to various Russia-owned entities, and had traveled to Russia as recently as July 2016. The EC also noted that Carter Page was the subject of an open, ongoing counterintelligence investigation assigned to the FBI’s New York Field Office (NYFO), which we describe in the next section.
The opening EC for the Manafort investigation stated that there was an articulable factual basis that Manafort ‘may wittingly or unwittingly be involved in activity on behalf of the Russian Federation which may constitute a federal crime or threat to the national security.’ The EC cross-referenced the predication for Crossfire Hurricane and stated that Manafort was designated the Delegate Process and Convention Manager for the Trump campaign, was promoted to Campaign Manager for the Trump campaign, and had extensive ties to pro-Russian entities of the Ukrainian government.
The opening EC for the Papadopoulos investigation stated that there was an articulable factual basis that Papadopoulos ‘may wittingly or unwittingly be involved in activity on behalf of the Russian Federation which may constitute a federal crime or threat to the national security.’ The EC cross-referenced the predication for Crossfire Hurricane and stated that Papadopoulos was a senior foreign adviser for the Trump campaign and had ‘made statements indicating that he is knowledgeable that the Russians made a suggestion to the Trump team that they could assist the Trump campaign with an anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to the Clinton Campaign.’
The opening EC for the Flynn investigation stated that there was an articulable factual basis that Flynn ‘may wittingly or unwittingly be involved in activity on behalf of the Russian Federation which may constitute a federal crime or threat to the national security.’ The EC cross-referenced the predication for Crossfire Hurricane and stated that Flynn was an advisor to the Trump campaign, had various ties to state-affiliated entities of Russia, and traveled to Russia in December 2015.”
Page 60 of the IG Report

In the very next section of the report, it notes that Carter Page was already part of a pre-existing FBI NY field office counterintelligence investigation. As is further explained on page vi of the Executive Summary regarding the investigation into Page:

“We did not find documentary or testimonial evidence that political bias or improper motivation influenced the FBI’s decision to seek FISA authority on Carter Page”
Page vi of the Executive Summary of the IG Report

What’s worse if the media characterization that this investigation involved multiple “illegal” FISA warrants. In reality, not only were all of the FISA warrants found to be perfectly justified, but there was never more than one in the first place. The only FISA warrant into an individual involved in Crossfire Hurricane was Carter Page himself.

“On September 19, 2016, the same day that the Crossfire Hurricane team first received Steele’s election reporting, the team contacted FBI OGC again about seeking a FISA order for Page and specifically focused on Steele’s reporting in drafting the FISA request. Two days later, on September 21, the FBI OGC Unit Chief contacted the NSD 01 Unit Chief to advise him that the FBI believed it was ready to submit a formal FISA request to 01 relating to Page. Almost immediately thereafter, 01 assigned an attorney (01 Attorney) to begin preparation of the application.
Although the team also was interested in seeking FISA surveillance targeting Papadopoulos, the FBI OGC attorneys were not supportive. FBI and NSD officials told us that the Crossfire Hurricane team ultimately did not seek FISA surveillance of Papadopoulos, and we are aware of no information indicating that the team requested or seriously considered FISA surveillance of Manafort or Flynn.”
Page vi of the Executive Summary of the IG Report

Furthermore, now that the right-wing media’s claims that the investigation was politically motivated, and that the FISA warrants were unlawful have been thoroughly debunked, how about that popular claim that the Steele Dossier was the primary reason for opening the investigation in the first place? Had these commentators read past the cover, they would’ve seen this inconvenient quote from page ii of the Executive Summary:

“We did not find information in FBI or Department ECs, emails, or other documents, or through witness testimony, indicating that any information other than the FFG information was relied upon to predicate the opening of t he Crossfire Hurricane investigation. Although not mentioned in the EC, at the time, FBI officials involved in opening the investigation had reason to believe that Russia may have been connected to the Wikileaks disclosures that occurred earlier in July 2016, and were aware of information regarding Russia’s efforts to interfere with the 2016 U.S. elections. These officials, though, did not become aware of Steele’s election reporting until weeks later and we therefore determined that Steele’s reports played no role in the Crossfire Hurricane opening.”
Page ii of the Executive Summary of the IG Report

So where are all of these accusations of corruption coming from? They stem from a small part of the report regarding private communications between two FBI agents involved in the investigation, Peter Strzok and Lisa Page. Keep in mind, these were private communications. Being federal employees, there are many rules that one must follow in the public light, which includes not endorsing or disparaging a political candidate or party, or taking certain political stances not related to their line of work. However, these were entirely private communications, wherein there are no rules of the like. As a federal employee, you are perfectly entitled to a political opinion, in fact, one might argue your opinion to be far more valid than those of the general public because of your proximity to federal issues.

This is irrelevant, though, as I said before. These were private communications, and have now even led to a lawsuit from Lisa Page against the FBI for releasing the private communications, as there is question regarding their validity to the investigation. No matter, the report itself may be critical of the communications, it also clearly states the following:

“As part of our review, we also sought to determine whether there was evidence that political bias or other improper considerations affected decision making in Crossfire Hurricane, including the decision to open the investigation. We discussed the issue of political bias in a prior OIG report, Review of Various Actions in Advance of the 2016 Election, where we described text and instant messages between then Special Counsel to the Deputy Director Lisa Page and then Section Chief Peter Strzok, among others, that included statements of hostility toward then candidate Trump and statements of support for then candidate Hillary Clinton. In this review, we found that, while Lisa Page attended some of the discussions regarding the opening of the investigations, she did not play a role in the decision to open Crossfire Hurricane or the four individual cases. We further found that while Strzok was directly involved in the decisions to open Crossfire Hurricane and the four individual cases, he was not the sole, or even the highest-level, decision maker as to any of those matters.
As noted above, then CD AD Priestap, Strzok’s supervisor, was the official who ultimately made the decision to open the investigation, and evidence reflected that this decision by Priestap was reached by consensus after multiple days of discussions and meetings that included Strzok and other leadership in CD, the FBI Deputy Director, the FBI General Counsel, and a FBI Deputy General Counsel. We concluded that Priestap’s exercise of discretion in opening the investigation was in compliance with Department and FBI policies, and we did not find documentary or testimonial evidence that political bias or improper motivation influenced his decision. We similarly found that, while the formal documentation opening each of the four individual investigations was approved by Strzok (as required by the DIOG), the Executive Summary Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane Investigation decisions to do so were reached by a consensus among the Crossfire Hurricane agents and analysts who identified individuals associated with the Trump campaign who had recently traveled to Russia or had other alleged ties to Russia. Priestap was involved in these decisions. We did not find documentary or testimonial evidence that political bias or improper motivation influenced the decisions to open the four individual investigations.”
Pages iii and iv of the Executive Summary of the IG Report

In conclusion, while the IG did recommend specific new FBI policies be put in place as precaution, the report did not conclude under any terms that there was any wrong-doing involved in the opening of Crossfire Hurricane, nor in the investigations into Papadopoulos, Manafort, or Flynn, nor in the FISA warrant in the investigation into Carter Page.

Let us not forget, Paul Manafort was sentenced to 7.5 years in prison; Michael Flynn was convicted of lying to the FBI in 2017, and his sentencing was delayed so that he could further cooperate with the Mueller probe; Papadopoulos was convicted of lying to the FBI and sentenced to twelve days in prison, one year of probation,and was fined almost $10,000; and while Carter Page has not been convicted to date, he is still part of an on-going investigation as of this writing. Looking at this track record, it would be hard to create a narrative that these men were under investigation for no other reason than political motivation.

While the right-wing press is still spinning their narratives, without a single quote from the actual report, mind you, remember how important it is to seek information for yourself. You can download the complete redacted report below. The redactions are likely due to on-going investigations, much like the Mueller Report redactions were upon its first public release. See above regarding Carter Page.

ig-fbi-report-1 Download